Τετάρτη 10 Σεπτεμβρίου 2014

Η πρώτη αξονομετρική σχεδιαστική αναπαράσταση του τάφου στην Αμφίπολη

Συνεχίζονται οι ανασκαφικές εργασίες στον λόφο Καστά από τη ΚΗ Εφορεία Προϊστορικών και Κλασικών Αρχαιοτήτων. Η αφαίρεση των αμμωδών χωμάτων συνεχίζεται οριζόντια και σε όλη την έκταση του χώρου, ανάμεσα στον διαφραγματικό τοίχο με τις Καρυάτιδες και τον τρίτο τοίχο, ώστε να επιτυγχάνεται η εξισορρόπηση των πιέσεων και να διασφαλίζεται σταθερά η στατική επάρκεια του μνημείου, σύμφωνα με τις αποφάσεις της διεπιστημονικής τεχνικής ομάδας.

Σήμερα, παρουσιάζεται η πρώτη αξονομετρική σχεδιαστική αναπαράσταση του ταφικού μνημείου, από τον αρχιτέκτονα του ΥΠΠΟΑ κ. Μ. Λεφαντζή με τους δύο διαφραγματικούς τοίχους επί των οποίων φέρονται, στον μεν πρώτο οι Σφίγγες, στο δε δεύτερο οι Καρυάτιδες. Οι εργασίες συντήρησης και στερέωσης τους συνεχίζονται.
Συνεχίζονται, επίσης, οι εργασίες τεκμηρίωσης του συνόλου των αρχαιολογικών ανασκαφικών εργασιών, με ψηφιακά και συμβατικά μέσα.

Μοναδικό το μνημείο της Αμφίπολης

Ο ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΙΚΟΣ ΜΙΧΑΛΗΣ ΤΙΒΕΡΙΟΣ ΣΤΟ ΕΘΝΟΣ:

Ως μοναδικό τόσο σε μέγεθος όσο και σε μορφή χαρακτηρίζει το ταφικό μνημείο της Αμφίπολης, μιλώντας στο «Εθνος» ο ομότιμος καθηγητής Κλασικής Αρχαιολογίας, ακαδημαϊκός, Μιχάλης Τιβέριος, σημειώνοντας παράλληλα ότι σε περισσότερα από τέσσερα ταφικά σύνολα και μνημεία υπάρχουν Καρυάτιδες, αναφέροντας χαρακτηριστικά τον θησαυρό των Σιφνέων στους Δελφούς.

Μοναδικό το μνημείο της Αμφίπολης
Ο μικρός ναϊσκος που δώρισαν οι κάτοικοι της Σίφνου ήταν από ακριβό μάρμαρο Πάρου και είναι περίφημος για τον γλυπτό του διάκοσμο, που αποτελεί ένα από τα αριστουργήματα της ύστερης αρχαϊκής τέχνης. Στην πρόσοψη, ανάμεσα στις παραστάδες, τοποθετήθηκαν αντί για κίονες δύο αγάλματα από κόρες, χαρακτηριστικά δείγματα ιωνικής τέχνης της περιόδου. «Υπάρχουν περισσότερα μνημεία με Καρυάτιδες, δείγματα της αρχαϊκής εποχής», μας είπε ο κ. Τιβέριος προσθέτοντας ότι το μοναδικό μνημείο της Αμφίπολης κρύβει στο εσωτερικό του ένα σημαντικό πρόσωπο. Το αποδεικνύουν αυτό τόσο οι σφίγγες, όσο και οι δύο εντυπωσιακές Καρυάτιδες, ενώ όλο το ταφικό σύνολο χρονολογείται στο τέλος του 4ου π.Χ. αιώνα.
Σύμφωνα με τον κ. Τιβέριο, Καρυάτιδες βρέθηκαν επίσης σε ταφικό σύνολο στην βορειοανατολική Βουλγαρία, κάτω από τον Δούναβη.
Ο καθηγητής αναφέρεται στον θαλαμοειδή τύμβο του Σβέτσαρι, που βρέθηκε τον Φεβρουάριο του 2013 και ανήκει στον βασιλιά των Γετών (σ.σ. θρακικό φύλο της βαλκανικής), Δρομιχαίτη και την σύζυγό του, που ήταν κόρη του Λυσίμαχου, στρατηγού του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου. Σύμφωνα με τους αρχαιολόγους, οι Καρυάτιδες της Αμφίπολης είναι ημίγλυφες, προσαρτημένες πάνω στους πεσσούς και είναι αρχαϊκές, μιμούνται δηλαδή τις αρχαϊκές κόρες.
Ο ακαδημαϊκός Μ. Τιβέριος τονίζει ότι το ταφικό μνημείο της Αμφίπολης είναι μοναδικό τόσο σε μέγεθος όσο και σε μορφή
Ο ακαδημαϊκός Μ. Τιβέριος τονίζει ότι το ταφικό μνημείο της Αμφίπολης είναι μοναδικό τόσο σε μέγεθος όσο και σε μορφή
Η διαφορά τους με αυτές του Σβέτσαρι είναι ότι οι τελευταίες είναι πιο «επαρχιώτικες» και όχι αρχαϊκές, αλλά στέκονται με τον ίδιο τρόπο και έχουν τον ίδιο ρόλο. Επίσης, τα ανασηκωμένα τους χέρια κάνουν το ίδιο με αυτό που έκαναν και τα ελλείποντα (δεξί και αριστερό αντίστοιχα) χέρια των Καρυάτιδων της Αμφίπολης, κρατούσαν δηλαδή, όπως δείχνει ο ελαφρά ανασηκωμένος ώμος το επιστύλιο και απέτρεπαν την είσοδο στους επιτήδειους, τυμβωρύχους ή άλλους.
Ο κ. Τιβέριος επαναλαμβάνει ότι είναι απίθανο «ένοικος» του τάφου να είναι ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος, ενώ εκτιμά ότι δεν θα μπορούσε να...φιλοξενεί την Ρωξάνη και τον γιο της Αλέξανδρο, καθώς για τον μεν πρώτο οι πηγές αναφέρουν ότι τάφηκε στην Αλεξάνδρεια για τον δε Αλέξανδρο Δ' η ταφή του θα γινόταν στις Αιγές, στους τάφους των βασιλιάδων της Μακεδονίας.
Για τον ακαδημαϊκό, που τα τελευταία 20 χρόνια έχει ανασκάψει την αρχαία Σίνδο και Θέρμη, η τοποθέτηση του Λέοντα στην κορυφή του τύμβου παραπέμπει μάλλον σε κάποιον στρατηγό.
«Η εμβληματική παρουσία του Λέοντα της Αμφίπολης δείχνει προς την κατεύθυνση κάποιου σημαντικού στρατηγού της εποχής, καθώς ο Λέων εκείνη την εποχή αποτελούσε σύμβολο της πολεμικής αρετής» λέει. Μεταξύ των ονομάτων που το τελευταίο διάστημα έχουν ακουστεί, ο κ. Τιβέριος ξεχωρίζει αυτό του Νέαρχου, αρχηγού του στόλου του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου και παιδικού του φίλου. Οπως αναφέρει, ο Νέαρχος είχε στενούς δεσμούς με την Αμφίπολη, που ήταν η ναυτική βάση των Μακεδόνων, καθώς εκεί τον είχε εξορίσει ο Φίλιππος Β΄, μαζί με άλλους φίλος του Αλέξανδρου.
Μελετώντας τις φωτογραφίες που δίνει στη δημοσιότητα το υπουργείο Πολιτισμού, ο καθηγητής εκτιμά ότι ο τάφος μάλλον έχει συληθεί, «άλλωστε τα περισσότερα ταφικά μνημεία της Μακεδονίας έχουν συληθεί, ελάχιστα, όπως οι βασιλικοί τάφοι της Βεργίνας, έχουν μείνει ανέπαφα», ενώ συνιστά ψυχραιμία στις εκτιμήσεις, υπομονή και αυτοσυγκράτηση σε όλους και αναμένει με ενδιαφέρον τα αποτελέσματα της ανασκαφής.
«Θέλω να τονίσω ότι δεν έχω ιδίαν αντίληψη της ανασκαφής, ως εκ τούτου ό,τι λέω πηγάζει από την πληροφόρηση που έχω, όπως όλοι από τις επίσημες ανακοινώσεις. Πρέπει ωστόσο όλοι μας να είμαστε συγκρατημένοι και να μην παρασυρόμαστε από την αδημονία» ανέφερε.
ΜΑΡΙΑ ΡΙΤΖΑΛΕΟΥ
ritzal@pegasus.gr

Τρίτη 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 2014

Israel, Turkey exchange diplomatic cold shoulders

Turkey's Erdogan pinpointing the villain
The State of Israel was not among the more than 90 countries that sent a representative to the festive Aug. 27 inauguration ceremony of Turkey’s 12th president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, officially named the most powerful man in the country’s history since the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Nor could a message from Jerusalem be found among the many dozens of congratulatory telegrams that arrived in Ankara to mark the event.
Erdogan’s crude attacks on Israel during his campaign coincided with the fighting against Hamas in Gaza. Israel must also have noticed that Turkey completely ignored its own presidential inauguration one month earlier, when Reuven Rivlin took the oath of office July 24.
I can testify that Rivlin is an enthusiastic supporter of mending the relationship between Israel and Turkey (as was his predecessor, former President Shimon Peres). Even in the midst of his presidential campaign, he had no qualms about stating so publicly. While there was somewhat more optimism then about the possibility of improving ties with Turkey, it was still not considered a very popular move.
It is safe to assume that Rivlin would have happily accepted the invitation sent by the Turkish government to the Israeli Embassy in Ankara to send an official representative to the inauguration if he had thought it would provide the momentum to break away from the crisis.
Two days later, Erdogan hosted all the senior diplomats in Turkey at a traditional reception to mark “Victory Day.” He even shook hands with the official Israeli representative and exchanged a few polite words with him. That representative was the charge d’affaires Yossi Levy-Sfari, the most senior Israeli diplomat in Ankara since Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu (then foreign minister and now prime minister) downgraded diplomatic relations between the two countries, recalled the Turkish ambassador and other senior embassy officials in Tel Aviv and expelled top Israeli representatives from Ankara.
It was the first time that Erdogan shook hands with an official Israeli representative since the Davos incident in 2009, when he lashed out at then-President Shimon Peres over the killing of Palestinians in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.
In Jerusalem, the Foreign Ministry expressed a measured degree of satisfaction that Erdogan did not prevent an invitation to the inauguration from being sent to the Israeli mission in Ankara. At the same time, however, the ministry avoided attributing a hidden or symbolic meaning to this nongesture. After all, relations between the two countries reached an unprecedented low following Erdogan’s comparison of Israel to Nazi Germany during Operation Protective Edge.
Diplomatic sources in Israel are frustrated by what they call Turkish ingratitude toward Israel after it allowed the country to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza, despite Erdogan's tongue lashing.
The few Israeli diplomats who remained in Turkey were kept very busy during the fighting in Gaza. They were not only tasked with explaining Israel’s positions — an essentially meaningless exercise in Erdogan’s Turkey — but even more importantly, with helping the Turkish government provide aid to the civilian population in Gaza. At the height of the fighting, Davutoglu announced an “airlift” of humanitarian aid from the Turks to Gaza.
An airlift is a beautiful idea, but as everybody knows, there is no airport in Gaza that can accept such a delivery — or a seaport, for that matter. Sending the aid via Egypt wasn’t an option, either, due to tensions between Cairo and Ankara. As such, the only way that Turkey could provide its emergency aid in the face of what it considered “diabolical Israeli violence” was through Israel itself.
And so, even while Erdogan continued to attack Israel in less than diplomatic language, transport planes from the Turkish air force were granted permission to land at Ben Gurion Airport. These planes carried tons of equipment and supplies intended for the people of Gaza.
According to figures provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Turkey provided thousands of meals to families in Gaza during Ramadan. As the fighting continued, that same agency provided 12 truckloads of medical and sanitation supplies to Gaza in the name of the Turkish people. The trucks passed from Israel to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom border crossing. The coordinator of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) activities in the territories told Al-Monitor that at the request of Turkish representatives in Gaza, these trucks contained “medicine and medical equipment as well as school bags, oil, toothpaste, garbage bags, canned tuna, disposable diapers, women’s sanitary pads, laundry detergent and towelettes.”
The C-130 Hercules transport planes of the Turkish military then flew back from Ben Gurion Airport to Turkey carrying a group of Palestinians from Gaza who had been wounded in the Israeli air raids. Each transportee was carefully selected to receive medical treatment in Turkey. So far, the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem has been working to approve the departure of dozens of injured Gazans and their escorts to Turkey, based on a detailed list provided by the Turks.
The decision to allow Turkey to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza at the height of the campaign should not be taken lightly. It was made despite opposition from those who believed that Erdogan did not deserve such a gesture from Israel while he attacked Israel and its leaders. In the end, it was decided to allow the aid as a gesture of goodwill, with the intention — or perhaps the hope — of improving relations between the two countries in some small way.
But good intentions were not enough. Jerusalem was surprised to read reports and telegrams arriving from Ankara, indicating that Erdogan was not only continuing with his diatribes against the Israeli government, but that Davutoglu also contributed to the vitriol. In his appearances before various forums, Davutoglu described efforts to provide aid to Israel as a Sisyphean task, working against Israel’s fervent opposition. He went on to say that Israel was doing everything it could to make it difficult for Turkey to provide aid to Gaza.
As part of the changes underway in Turkey, Erdogan chose Davutoglu to be his prime minister. Turkish officials involved in the relationship between the two countries estimate that it will be very difficult if not impossible to get back on the track of normalization between the two countries, mainly because Turkey is facing yet another election in 2015 (this one for parliament). Erdogan and Davutoglu, they say, both believe that their anti-Israel approach will win lots of votes.
One person who maintains a certain degree of optimism about the relationship between the two countries is the head of the Israel-Turkey Business Council, Menashe Carmon. In a conversation with Al-Monitor, he said Turkish businessmen tend to avoid politics. This year, trade between the two countries will amount to $5 billion (in 2011 it was $4 billion, and $1.5 billion in 2005), and the only threat he mentioned was the possibility of an economic crisis in Turkey. Furthermore, he emphasized that Turkey is not like Europe in that there are no calls there for a boycott of Israel. Quite the contrary, he pointed out, it is Israelis who are boycotting Turkish products. As a result of Erdogan’s statements and policies, many Israelis canceled their summer vacation reservations in Turkey and workers committees have announced that they will not be purchasing vacation packages there, at least in the foreseeable future.
Turkey will manage without Israeli tourists, who made up just 2% of visitors to the country in 2010. Israel emphasizes, though, that the real culprit in this ongoing crisis is Erdogan, who insists on foregoing any chance he may have had to have a real impact on the fate of the people he calls “his Palestinian brothers.” Had he conducted his affairs differently, he could have really helped the suffering people of Gaza with more than just garbage bags and canned goods.



Τρίτη 26 Αυγούστου 2014

KRG, PKK make unlikely allies as they battle IS together


PKK soldiers stand at attention at the funeral of Deniz Firat, a PKK journalist who was killed by IS in Makhmur, south of Erbil, while filming PKK guerrillas fighting IS, Aug. 9, 2014.  (photo by Kamal Chomani)
Attacks led by the Islamic State have brought together all Kurdish forces who are, for the first time in modern history, joining efforts to protect the people.
On Aug. 3, this collaboration took place: YPG, the People’s Protection Units of Rojava (Syria’s Kurdistan) joined Iraqi Kurdistan Region peshmerga forces and rescued some of the peshmerga forces after the Islamic State (IS) offensive on Sinjar after the Kurdistan Region had put an embargo on Rojava for almost three years.
In the past three years, there have been political conflicts between the two biggest Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), led by Abdulla Ocalan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, over ruling Rojava and sharing power between their two affiliated parties; the pro-PKK Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the pro-KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party-Syria (KDP-S).
Diyar Qamishlo, representative of The Syrian Kurdistan's Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM) in Iraqi Kurdistan, told Al-Monitor that in the past three years since Rojava’s revolution started, PYD was able to form three cantons. On the other side, KDP-S and KDP accuse PYD of ruling Rojava unilaterally.
“We helped the peshmerga forces and rescued them from death. We did this wholeheartedly as we believe this was what people expected us to do,” said Qamishlo.
Ali Hussein, KDP’s member of the Leadership Council, did not hide his party’s concerns about PKK. He told Al-Monitor, “We have had relations with PKK since the 1980s and we have had common ideas, but we have also had differences. The problem of PKK and PYD is that they are not coordinating with other parties in Rojava. They should share power with them, but of course we have appreciated the collaborations.”
Sa’di Ahmed Pira, a PUK politburo member, is optimistic that the changes in regional political dynamics will strengthen the relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government, including KDP, and PKK. He told Al-Monitor that PKK and YPG military support for peshmerga forces in fighting IS had already been agreed upon.
Last year, the KDP dug a long trench between Iraqi Kurdistan and PYD-controlled areas of Syria. At that time, the trenches were considered as a “betrayal” by pro-PKK media and loyalists. Pira said that these events will not return, because “the ones [KDP] who dug the trenches are now filling them after being assured that YPG forces will not be a threat. IS had one positive [effect], which is that it brought us all together.”
Hitherto, PKK and YPG forces have taken part in fighting against ISIS in the three front lines: Jalawla, Makhmour and Sinjar. Soon after the IS attacks, YPG joined peshmerga forces and helped rescuing them and hundreds of thousands of Yazidis who had been stranded in Mount Sinjar.
Despite that peshmerga has better weaponry than YPG and PKK guerrillas, the latter have been more successful in fighting IS.
Salah Dilmani, brigadier of Ballak 118 Brigade, who has led the fighting against IS in Jalawla frontline, highly appreciated YPG and PKK support of peshmerga. Dilmani told Al-Monitor of his happiness about PKK’s intervention and showed willingness to continue these military collaborations. “We should not be ashamed that YPG and PKK forces are much more skillful in fighting against IS, undoubtedly, they have very good experiences.”
Though the number of PKK and YPG forces has not been revealed, some have been suspicious about their wishes to control Sinjar. Osman Ocalan, a former PKK leader, doubted that PKK wanted to create a Sinjar Canton and settle its power in the area. To remove these concerns, Hageed Damhat, PKK’s spokesman, said that the PKK “has no wishes to create any cantons for Sinjar or control the city. We just want to help people escape from death; we want liberation of the city and nothing more.”
But Diyar Qamishlo of YPG did not hide that Shingali people have formed the Sinjar Protection Units, which were affiliated with the YPG. He said, “But these people have been organized to stop IS attacks, not to control the town for us. They decide what they will do, not us.”
Some in KRG believe that KDP’s bad relations with Rojava were due to its good relations with Turkey, because the latter never wants a de facto region for PKK in Syria.
Mohammed Ali, a member of the Gorran Movement Political Room, spoke to Al-Monitor about KRG and Rojava relations and the future of these relations.
“In the past few years, the policy of KDP has dominated KRG’s position toward PKK and Rojava, which I condemn. It is obvious that KDP’s policy has been in favor of the Turkish authority rather than the interests of the Kurdish nation. Therefore, the relationship between KRG-PKK should be institutionalized and nationalized. The policy of KRG’s institutions, especially the parliament, government and presidency of the region, should reflect the interests of the Kurdish nation rather than the interests of one party or group,” Ali elaborated.
Accordingly, Aliza Marcus, author of “Blood and Belief,” a book on the PKK, expects that this current conflict in Iraq is going to improve the PKK's respect among Kurds in Syria and Iraq. “For Iraqi Kurds in particular, the PKK's willingness to support people under IS attack was very important. Now that [KRG President Massoud] Barzani himself has met with the PKK and thanked them for the efforts, he will come under more pressure to go ahead with a national congress.”
Marcus, unlike others, does not think the KRG-PKK relations improved after IS attacks “The PKK and KRG will never be the closest of friends. There's a lot of violent history and mistrust between them. But it will be very hard in the future for the KRG to criticize the PKK's presence or block the PYD in Syria. The KRG needs the PKK right now, and the PKK has proven its commitment to Kurdish nationalism by sending fighters to help.”
Dilmani believes that “KRG is forced to be closer to PKK and build healthier and better relations, as the current situation has proven PKK’s strength and security collaboration.”



Τετάρτη 20 Αυγούστου 2014

Turkey’s only Greek-language newspaper faces closure

Mihail Vasiliadis, owner of the Apoyevmatini newspaper, looks at the paper in his office in Istanbul, July 12, 2011. (photo by MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty Images)

I was shaken when I read the news that Turkey’s only Greek-language newspaper, Apoyevmatini, had ceased publication. I knew it was inevitable, but it was nonetheless going to be the end of a history that I did not want to come to a close. The number of non-Muslims in Turkey has dwindled so much that every negative report I hear about them adds to my fears that one day nothing will be left behind of them in this country.

Orhan Kemal Cengiz
Contributor, Turkey Pulse
Orhan Kemal Cengiz is a human rights lawyer, columnist and former president of the Human Rights Agenda Association, a Turkish NGO that works on human rights issues ranging from the prevention of torture to the rights of the mentally disabled. Since 2002, Cengiz has been the lawyer for the Alliance of Turkish Protestant Churches.
II contacted Mihail Vasiliadis, the editor-in-chief of Apoyevmatini. He told me the news report had been wrong, but his explanation of why it was wrong and what the real story was made me ponder Turkey's yesterday and tomorrow.
Vasiliadis said that the newspaper will not be closed “for the time being,” but that unless he soon finds additional resources to cover rent payments, the paper's 90-year-old office in the Syrian Arcade in Istanbul’s Beyoglu district will indeed have to be shuttered. He had hoped to turn the space into a museum on Istanbul's Greek press, but could not find support for the project. He said that he is able to put the paper together from his home, for the time being.
Apoyevmatini's founders had been cousins of Vasiliadis’ father. The newspaper is published these days by Vasiliadis and his son alone. The Syrian Arcade had been built by Dimitri Vasiliadis, an uncle of the newspaper's founders, thus making Apoyevmatini a privileged tenant. Although the newspaper's ownership changed hands many times over the years, its location remained the same.
Vasiliadis describes Apoyevmatini as the “world's highest circulation” newspaper, by which he was referring to the ratio of the target audience to readership. He says almost every potential reader is a subscriber. A 2011 report by the London-based Minority Rights Group estimated that there were only 3,000 Greeks left in Istanbul. According to Vasiliadis, that number is now 1,700 to 1,800. These figures are even more distressing given that at one time, more than a million Greeks lived in Turkey, pointing to the sad history and withering away of a minority.
Vasiliadis said there are 605 Greek families in Istanbul, and 600 of those are Apoyevmatini subscribers. One wonders if indeed with such phenomenal access to its target audience whether Apoyevmatini should be considered as one of the highest circulation newspapers in the world. Regardless, the newspaper does not have the money to pay its rent.
Vasiliadis and his son work into the early hours of the morning, five days a week, to put out the paper. Their distributors deliver each edition by hand, one by one, to Istanbul’s Greeks. The money subscribers pay only meets distribution costs.
Apoyevmatini’s history of declining circulation follows the history of minorities in Turkey. Vasiliadis said there were about 120,000 Greeks in Istanbul during the 1930s and 1940s, at which time the newspaper had a circulation of 35,000. During the paper's heyday, 35 people worked to publish it.
Thear year 1964 was a crucial turning point for the Greeks of Turkey and Apoyevmatini. Istanbul Greeks paid dearly for the tensions that developed between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus issue. Some 13,000 Greeks living in Istanbul were given 24 hours to leave the country. They were allowed to take $20 and 20 kilograms (44 pounds) of belongings. The number 20 thereafter became a traumatic symbol among Istanbul's Greek community.
Apoyevmatini’s circulation fell below 10,000 after the 1964 expulsions. That same year, Apoyevmatini was denied the option of printing paid official announcements, marking the beginning of the end of the newspaper.
Vasiliadis took over the newspaper in 2002, when its circulation had fallen to 80. Yorgi Adasoglu, who was managing the newspaper, had developed cancer and could not leave his home. As he approached death, so did the newspaper. At this point, Vasiliadis entered the picture to buy the paper founded by his father's cousins. After he managed to attract advertisements from Greece, the newspaper returned to life. It fell back into a coma in 2011, however, when the economic crisis in Greece slashed the paper's advertising revenue.
Just as Vasiliadis was running out of hope, something interesting happened. In 2011, Vasiliadis attended a discussion on minorities. In an account of the meeting reported on a website, Vasiliadis said he had reached the point of closing Apoyevmatini. A young Turk pursuing his doctorate in Holland was following the meeting online. He was touched by the report, leading him to launch a Facebook page featuring the slogan “Apoyevmatini is Turkey’s common heritage” and calling on Turks to subscribe. Vasiliadis said that within one week, 400 Turks who did not know a word of Greek had subscribed. He tried to publish a Turkish edition of the paper at least once a week, but ultimately could not afford it.
Vasiliadis said he cannot bring himself to tell his non-Greek-speaking customers that their subscriptions have expired. He is carrying on with the money raised from classified advertisements and other subscriptions. Vasiliadis and his son are now publishing the paper from their home.
In an earlier article, I had reported that Greeks were returning to Turkey. I asked Vasiliadis if their numbers can raise the Greek population in Turkey and also help his newspaper survive. He said their number is small. Those returning are not coming to work and settle in Turkey, but tend to be retirees and people seeking to recover their property. The Greek community can resurrect itself only if those who return actively engage in Turkey's work and economic life.
Vasiliadis proposed that to compensate for the 13,000 Greeks forcefully deported in 1964, the Turkish state should give work and residence permits to 13,000 Greeks as a good start. He said he can continue publishing Apoyevmatini until 2015, despite soon having to close the office.
The history of Turkey’s only Greek-language newspaper is one of the narratives in the sad, painful history of minorities in Turkey. One can only hope that the end of this saga will be the end of the misfortunes of Turkey’s minorities.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/cengiz-only-greek-language-newspaper-closing-down.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+%5BEnglish%5D&utm_campaign=4c13a54043-August_19_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_28264b27a0-4c13a54043-93086189#ixzz3AyFhIZns

Τρίτη 19 Αυγούστου 2014

Σκληρό άρθρο του Spiegel κατά της Μέρκελ: Η πολιτική της απέτυχε, η Ελλάδα παραμένει υπερχρεωμένη

Η ευρωκρίση είναι εδώ, ο Άνγκελα Μέρκελ κυνηγάει ανεμόμυλους, η πολιτική της μεταφέρει τα προβλήματα και δεν τα επιλύει, ενώ συνολικά μοιάζει με κάποιον ιδιοκτήτη σπιτιού που γεμίσει υγρασία και το μόνο που κάνει είναι να το... βάφει.
Με αυτή τη σκληρή ανάλυση το Spiegel επιτίθεται ευθέως στην Γερμανίδα καγκελάριο, εγκαλώντας την για αναποτελεσματικότητα στα μέτρα που επέβαλε για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης.
Όπως αναμεταδίδει η Deutsche Welle, o αρθρογράφος Βόλφγκανγκ Μινχάου σημειώνει μεταξύ άλλων: «Ο πολυδιαφημισμένος πραγματισμός της Άγκελα Μέρκελ αποδεικνύεται οφθαλμαπάτη», εξηγώντας ότι οι κινήσεις της καγκελαρίου στο πεδίο της διαχείρισης της «ευρωκρίσης» είναι συγκρίσιμες με τις προσπάθειες ενός ιδιοκτήτη κατοικίας να καταπολεμήσει την υγρασία στους τοίχους του σπιτιού του με ένα νέο βάψιμο. «Ο ευρωχώρος είναι ασθενής. Δεν θα πρέπει πλέον να κάνουμε λόγο για κρίση. Η κρίση συνεπάγεται αλλαγή και η δική μας η ασθένεια είναι χρόνια» επισημαίνει ο γερμανός αναλυτής, επικαλούμενος τη μείωση του ρυθμού ανάπτυξης στις χώρες της ευρωζώνης. «Στη Γερμανία είναι λιγότερο αισθητή αυτή η ύπουλη αρρώστια, αλλά και εδώ σημειώθηκε ξαφνικά πτώση της ανάπτυξης κατά το δεύτερο τρίμηνο του έτους. Συρρικνωνόμαστε στον ίδιο ρυθμό με την Ιταλία και με πιο ισχυρούς ρυθμούς σε σχέση με τη Γαλλία» παρατηρεί ο Μινχάου, υπενθυμίζοντας, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι τα επόμενα χρόνια η Γερμανία θα υποστεί και δημογραφικό σοκ.
Όπως η Ιαπωνία
Ο γερμανός αναλυτής συγκρίνει την κατάσταση στην ευρωζώνη με εκείνη της Ιαπωνίας την προηγούμενη δεκαετία για να υποστηρίξει ότι σε τελική ανάλυση «η Ιαπωνία είχε τύχη μέσα στην ατυχία της», καθώς κατόρθωσε να εξομαλύνει τη μείωση του χρέους του ιδιωτικού τομέα με την χρέωση του κράτους. «Εάν οι Ιάπωνες είχαν υιοθετήσει το γερμανικό «χρεόφρενο» ή τους δημοσιονομικούς κανόνες της συνθήκης του Μάαστριχτ, η χώρα θα είχε καταρρεύσει», εκτιμά ο Μινχάου, προβαίνοντας στο εξής συμπέρασμα: «Aκριβώς με αυτή την απειλή είμαστε τώρα αντιμέτωποι... Η κατάρρευση συνιστά μια κατάσταση διαρκούς αδυναμίας με μηδενική ανάπτυξη, υψηλά πραγματικά επιτόκια, υπερτιμημένες συναλλαγματικές ισοτιμίες- και όλα αυτά επί δεκαετίες».
Η Ελλάδα και η Πορτογαλία
«Βρίσκουμε μπροστά μας τώρα τις εσωτερικές αντιφάσεις μιας Νομισματικής Ένωσης, η οποία θέλει να είναι μόνο νομισματική και τίποτε περισσότερο. Αντί να επιλύσουμε την κρίση χρέους με μια διάσκεψη για το χρέος, μεταθέτουμε το πρόβλημα, δημιουργώντας πολύπλοκες ομπρέλες προστασίας, οι οποίες μεταφέρουν σε τελική ανάλυση τα χρέη από τη μία γωνία του συστήματος στην άλλη. Αυτό φαίνεται καλό, αλλά στην πραγματικότητα δεν αλλάζει τίποτε στην υπερχρέωση της Ελλάδας και της Πορτογαλίας», επισημαίνει ο Βόλφγκανγκ Μινχάου.
Ο γερμανός αναλυτής αμφισβητεί και την πολιτική της αγοράς κρατικών ομολόγων από την ΕΚΤ, στην οποία επιρρίπτει ότι παραμέλησε την παραδοσιακή νομισματική πολιτική, παρακολουθώντας άπρακτη την πτώση του πληθωρισμού. «Στο επισφαλές θεμέλιο μιας απατηλής ελπίδας για ανάκαμψη στηρίζεται η σημερινή φήμη της Μέρκελ. Η κατάσταση μας είναι συγκρίσιμη με εκείνη του ιδιοκτήτη μιας κατοικίας, ο οποίος βλέπει με φρίκη τον λεκέ της υγρασίας να βγαίνει κάτω από τον βαμμένο τοίχο και ο οποίος όχι μόνο έχει ξοδέψει τσάμπα λεφτά για το βάψιμο, αλλά πρέπει τώρα να δαπανήσει ακόμη περισσότερα, επειδή μετέθεσε στο μέλλον τη λύση του προβλήματος. Εμείς όλοι, εκτός από τη Μέρκελ, θα κληθούμε να πληρώσουμε ακριβά την πολιτική της καθυστέρησης», καταλήγει ο γερμανός αναλυτής.

http://www.iefimerida.gr/node/167127#ixzz3AqxirICc

Παρασκευή 15 Αυγούστου 2014

Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end

By Henry A. Kissinger March 5

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.


Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 , when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or break up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanu­kovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymo­shenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.

4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.