A Greek exit from the euro area has
the potential to be the European Union’s most economically and
politically destructive event of a generation. Unfortunately,
Europe has reached the point where it must prepare for such an
outcome.
Whether Greeks want it or not, circumstances could soon
force their country to return to the drachma. Europe’s leaders,
as Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker hinted, might
extend Greece’s deadlines to meet the budget targets required
for rescue money, but they won’t provide emergency financing to
a government that refuses austerity measures. Without Europe’s
help, Greece’s government (whoever ends up leading it) faces a
dilemma: Cut spending even more than under the austerity
program, or default on its debts and print a new currency to pay
its bills.
A return to the drachma would be painful. The currency
would immediately be worth a fraction of a euro, and would
depreciate further if the government printed money to finance
deficit spending. Bank depositors would get devalued drachmas,
if they got anything at all. Businesses would be starved of
credit. Prices and wages would probably rise to compensate for
the currency’s loss of value, eroding the benefit of a cheap
currency to Greek exporters.
Daunting Challenge
The rest of Europe would face the daunting challenge of
containing the fallout. To that end, as Bloomberg View columnist
Clive Crook notes today, it must be prepared to do all the same
fiscal reforms and take all the same emergency measures needed
to keep the euro area intact, and more. Even then, a Greek exit
would have unpredictable consequences.
First, Europe would have to absorb immediate losses on
money lent to Greece. The country has about 400 billion euros in
external debts, which its government, banks and companies would
probably pay only in part or in drachmas. European taxpayers
would suffer the lion’s share of the losses: Their exposure by
way of the European Central Bank, national central banks and EU
lending programs amounts to more than 300 billion euros. The
rest would fall on private companies and banks, particularly in
France, possibly requiring governments to step in and provide
capital.
Second, European officials would need a plan to stop bank
runs. As soon as Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and maybe even
French depositors see footage of Greeks clamoring for their
savings, they’ll want to get their euros out of local banks as
quickly as possible. Bank holidays and bans on withdrawals would
help only temporarily. To prevent a collapse of the banking
system, Europe’s leaders would have to guarantee all deposits in
euro-area banks, a move that would put Germany and other core
countries on the hook for insuring more than 3 trillion euros in
Italian and Spanish deposits. Common deposit insurance would
also require euro-area governments to achieve in a matter of
days a harmonization of banking regulation that has escaped them
for more than a decade.
Third, Europe would have to calm market fears that other
euro-area countries, such as Portugal and Spain, might follow
Greece’s lead. Investors’ worries about such an outcome could
become self-fulfilling if they pushed borrowing costs up to
levels that the governments can’t bear -- a trend already
evident in the yield on Spain’s 10-year bond, which stood at 6.3
percent Tuesday, up from less than 5 percent in early March. To
keep interest rates down, the ECB could buy even more government
bonds than it already has, or lend banks more money to do so.
This could eventually leave the ECB holding or financing all the
debt of the afflicted governments.
Market Confidence
Alternatively, the ECB could try to restore market
confidence with a show of overwhelming force, guaranteeing the
repayment of all struggling euro-area governments’ debts for the
foreseeable future. But even this course of action, which
Bloomberg View has advocated as part of a plan to hold the euro
together, might not have the desired healing effect after a
Greek exit.
There would be political as well as economic costs. Greece
is highly unlikely to leave the EU in a fit of nationalist pique
-- it doesn’t want to face Turkey alone over Cyprus, or to see
Balkan neighbors such as Albania, Macedonia and Serbia join the
EU while it seethes outside. But for a European project that has
been expanding and integrating ever more deeply since its
formation as a six-nation coal and steel production union in
1951, a Greek exit from the euro -- especially if followed by
other countries -- would mark a turning point. For example, if
Greece can leave the euro, why not kick it out of the Schengen
open-border zone? The majority of illegal immigrants to the EU
come through Greece’s border with Turkey. It’s hard to predict
what else might unravel.
Given the potential for unintended and unforeseen
consequences, the least bad course for Greece and the EU
remains, as Juncker hinted, for deadlines to be waived long
enough for Greece to form a government that would recommit to a
reform program. To make such an outcome possible, Europe’s
leaders should move beyond self-defeating austerity and take
immediate steps to support growth in Greece and other struggling
countries. Failing that, Europe will have no choice but to
prepare for the worst.
To contact the Bloomberg View editorial board:
view@bloomberg.net.
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